The French Parliamentary Permacrisis: The Beginning of a New Political Reality
In October 2022, when Rishi Sunak assumed office as British prime minister, he was the fifth British prime minister to occupy the position in six years.
Unleashed on the UK by Brexit, this represented exceptional governmental instability. So how might we describe what is occurring in the French Republic, now on its sixth premier in 24 months – three of them in the last ten months?
The latest prime minister, the recently reappointed Sébastien Lecornu, may have gained a brief respite on that day, abandoning Emmanuel Macron’s key pension reform in return for support from Socialist lawmakers as the cost of his administration's continuation.
But it is, in the best case, a short-term solution. The EU’s number two economic power is locked in a political permacrisis, the likes of which it has not experienced for many years – perhaps not since the start of its Fifth French Republic in 1958 – and from which there seems no simple way out.
Governing Without a Majority
Key background: from the moment Macron initiated an ill-advised snap general election in 2024, the nation has had a divided assembly separated into three opposing factions – the left, far right and his own centrist coalition – none with anything close to a majority.
Simultaneously, the nation faces dual debt and deficit crises: its debt-to-GDP ratio and budget shortfall are now almost twice the EU threshold, and hard constitutional deadlines to pass a 2026 budget that at least begins to rein in spending are nigh.
In this challenging environment, both Lecornu’s immediate predecessors – Michel Barnier, who lasted from September to December 2024, and François Bayrou, who took office from December 2024 to September 2025 – were removed by parliament.
In mid-September, the leader named his trusted associate Lecornu as his latest PM. But when, a little over two weeks ago, Lecornu unveiled his new cabinet – which turned out to be largely unchanged from before – he faced fury from both supporters and rivals.
So much so that the following day, he resigned. After only 27 days as premier, Lecornu became the shortest-lived premier in modern French history. In a respectful address, he cited political rigidity, saying “partisan attitudes” and “personal ambitions” would make his job all but impossible.
A further unexpected development: shortly after Lecornu’s resignation, Macron requested he remain for two more days in a last-ditch effort to secure multi-party support – a task, to put it mildly, filled with challenges.
Next, two ex-prime ministers publicly turned on the embattled president. Meanwhile, the right-wing RN and leftist LFI declined to engage with Lecornu, vowing to reject any and every new government unless there were snap elections.
Lecornu stuck at his job, talking to everyone who was prepared to hear him out. At the conclusion of his extension, he went on TV to say he believed “a path still existed” to avoid elections. The president’s office confirmed the president would name a fresh premier two days later.
Macron honored his word – and on Friday appointed … Sébastien Lecornu, again. So this week – with Macron commenting from the wings that the country’s rival political parties were “creating discord” and “entirely to blame for the turmoil” – was Lecornu’s critical test. Would he endure – and can he pass that vital budget?
In a high-stakes speech, the young prime minister spelled out his budget priorities, giving the Socialist party, who detest Macron’s unpopular pension overhaul, what they were expecting: Macron’s key policy would be suspended until 2027.
With the conservative Les Républicains (LR) already on board, the Socialists said they would refuse to support no-confidence motions proposed against Lecornu by the extremist factions – meaning the government should survive those votes, scheduled for Thursday.
It is, nevertheless, far from guaranteed to be able to pass its planned €30bn budget squeeze: the PS clearly stated that it would be seeking more concessions. “This,” said its leader, Olivier Faure, “is just the start.”
Changing Political Culture
The issue is, the greater concessions he makes to the left, the more opposition he'll face from the right. And, like the PS, the conservatives are themselves split on dealing with the administration – certain members remain eager to bring it down.
A glance at the parliamentary arithmetic shows how difficult his mission – and longer-term survival – will be. A total of 264 deputies from the far-right RN, radical-left LFI, Greens, Communists and UDR want him out.
To achieve that, they need a 288-vote majority in parliament – so if they can persuade just 24 of the PS’s 69 members or the LR’s 47 (or both) to vote with them, Macron’s fifth unstable premier in 24 months is, similar to his forerunners, toast.
Most expect this to occur soon. Even if, by an unlikely turn, the divided parliament summons up the collective responsibility to approve a budget this year, the outlook afterward look grim.
So is there a way out? Snap elections would be doubtful to resolve the issue: surveys indicate pretty much every party bar the RN would see reduced representation, but there would still be no clear majority. A fresh premier would confront identical numerical challenges.
An alternative might be for Macron himself to step down. After a presidential vote, his successor would disband the assembly and aim for a legislative majority in the following election. But this also remains unclear.
Polls suggest the next occupant of the Elysée Palace will be Marine Le Pen or Jordan Bardella. There is at least an odds-on chance that France’s voters, having chosen a far-right leader, might think twice about handing them control of parliament.
In the end, France may not escape its predicament until its leaders accept the new political reality, which is that clear majorities are a thing of the past, absolute victory is obsolete, and negotiation doesn't mean defeat.
Many think that transformation will not be feasible under the country’s current constitution. “This isn't a standard political crisis, but a crise de régime” that will prove anything but temporary.
“The system wasn't built to encourage – and even disincentivizes – the formation of ruling alliances common in the rest of Europe. The Fifth Republic could be in its final stage.”